8 engagements. One method.

Situation

~€40k/mo marketing spend across LinkedIn Ads, SEO, events and a podcast. MQL volume looked healthy — 220+ per month — but only 6% converted to SQL. Sales thought marketing was shipping noise. Marketing thought sales wasn't calling back. Both were partly right. Pipeline contribution from marketing was stuck at 18% for three quarters. The board had started asking why.

What I changed

• →Sharpened the ICP from generic "manufacturing" to discrete manufacturing, 200–2,000 FTE, in-house engineering – as the rulebook the agents scored accounts against.
• →Killed 2 of 5 programs (podcast, broad SEO). Reinvested the time into ABM on 80 named accounts, monitored continuously by the signal agent.
• →Weekly steering cadence with a shared pipeline hypothesis and three owners – the weekly was prepared by the pipeline reporting agent.
• →Sales–marketing SLA: lead routing, time-to-touch, disposition feedback within 48h – watched by the inbox & ops agent.

What happened

• ✓MQLs dropped from 220 to 95/month. SQL rate rose from 6% to 21%.
• ✓Marketing-sourced pipeline grew 2.4× over two quarters, same budget, same headcount.
• ✓Sales cycle shortened meaningfully on marketing-sourced deals.
• ✓Leadership stopped asking whether marketing worked. They started asking where to invest next.

Situation

Strong output: blog, podcast, two event series, a newsletter, paid social across three networks, an SDR-aligned content track, partner marketing, community, and four lifecycle journeys. All running in parallel. Pipeline per marketing FTE was under €140k/year — below the B2B SaaS benchmark. Leadership couldn't tell which program was pulling weight.

What I changed

• →10-day diagnosis of each program's real pipeline contribution, prepared by the pipeline reporting agent – then paused or killed 8 of 14 programs.
• →Focused the team on two levers: competitive displacement and expansion into the install base.
• →Named one accountable owner per lever; the inbox & ops agent kept owners and tasks current. No more "marketing did it together".
• →Weekly steering on hypothesis, result, next bet. The QA & brand guard agent checked that stopped programs really disappeared from channels and website.

What happened

• ✓Pipeline per marketing FTE more than doubled in two quarters.
• ✓Win rate on competitive deals rose sharply after the dedicated play launched.
• ✓Team sentiment improved — fewer context switches, clearer definition of done.
• ✓Two laid-off program areas came back later, but staffed correctly this time.

Situation

Marketing ran almost exclusively new-logo acquisition: paid, events, outbound support, demand content. But ~70% of incremental ARR was coming from expansion — more seats, more modules, more departments. NRR sat at 102% and was trending down. Customer success and marketing had no shared rhythm, no shared view of accounts.

What I changed

• →Built a customer marketing lever into the operating system with four repeatable plays – triggered by expansion signals the signal agent spotted in existing accounts.
• →Reallocated 1 FTE from broad demand gen to expansion programs, with CS as co-owner.
• →Monthly CS × marketing × account management sync on the top 200 accounts, with expansion and new-logo pipeline separated by the pipeline reporting agent.
• →Expansion-specific content track: module stories, department rollout playbooks, champion enablement – produced with the angle & content agent.

What happened

• ✓NRR moved from 102% to 111% over two quarters and held there.
• ✓Expansion pipeline grew 3.2×, feeding the same AM team without adding headcount.
• ✓New logo ARR stayed stable — the feared trade-off didn't materialise.
• ✓CS leadership started pulling marketing into QBR prep instead of the reverse.

Situation

"We do ABM" meant: 300 named accounts in a spreadsheet, a LinkedIn filter, and a vague promise to sales. No tiering, no plays, no SLA, no reporting that connected activity to meetings or pipeline. Enterprise AEs had stopped expecting anything from marketing. Average contract value had plateaued. The Enterprise segment was below plan for two consecutive quarters.

What I changed

• →Re-tiered 300 accounts into 60 tier 1 and 140 tier 2 – the rest went to demand gen. The outreach routing agent built the buying center per named account.
• →Three named plays per tier: trigger-based, content-anchored, with clear AE ownership. The paid media agent kept audiences and creatives per role current.
• →Wired intent signals and engagement data straight into the AE daily queue – not into dashboards. The signal agent flagged which accounts were moving.
• →Weekly ABM steering with sales leadership. Every account had a named next step.

What happened

• ✓ACV on closed-won enterprise deals rose 34% over three quarters.
• ✓Named account pipeline grew 4.1× versus the trailing baseline.
• ✓Time from first account signal to first meeting dropped 42%.
• ✓AE leadership now budgets time for marketing syncs. They didn't before.

Situation

Eleven paying customers, all founder-sourced through network and conference hallway chats. Pipeline flat for two months. The founder was running out of warm intros and the Series A conversation expected a system, not a rolodex. First marketing hire planned. Wrong hire would cost ~€120k fully loaded plus twelve months of wasted runway.

What I changed

• →90-day revenue marketing blueprint before any hiring or campaign spend.
• →Rewrote the hire profile: "revenue marketing lead", not "head of marketing". Different person.
• →Sharpened the ICP from "anyone using LLMs" to platform teams at AI-first companies, post-Series A – the signal agent gave the founder prioritized accounts instead of gut feeling.
• →Activated two entry plays – technical teardowns and focused LinkedIn presence – produced by the angle & content agent from founder knowledge, with steering from week one.

What happened

• ✓First marketing-sourced SQLs landed in week 7, before the new hire had started.
• ✓The right hire joined in week 10 and walked into a running system, not a blank page.
• ✓Q1 pipeline hit 124% of plan — the number the Series A conversation asked for.
• ✓Founder reclaimed ~12h/week previously spent on ad-hoc marketing decisions.

Situation

Strong product, strong community, 80k monthly active devs. New strategy: add a sales-led enterprise motion without hollowing out the community trust that got them there. No one on the team had built enterprise demand before. The risk wasn't doing nothing. The risk was accidentally becoming another "we do enterprise now" DevTool with a worse blog.

What I changed

• →Dual-track ICP model: developer champion and enterprise economic buyer, connected through named use cases. The signal agent detected the enterprise accounts behind developer usage.
• →Designed a community-to-pipeline bridge – how a champion becomes a paid trial becomes an AE conversation. The outreach routing agent added the decision makers.
• →Sales-led content track separate from community content, with its own editorial calendar. The product truth agent kept security and compliance claims in sync with product docs.
• →Sprint cadence for the enterprise motion only, so community work kept its own rhythm.

What happened

• ✓First 14 enterprise SQLs in quarter two of the build. Three closed inside two quarters.
• ✓Three lighthouse logos signed — two Fortune 500, one scale-up — enough to carry the category narrative.
• ✓Average enterprise deal size ran ~6× the self-serve average.
• ✓Community metrics stayed flat-to-up. No backlash, no trust tax.

Situation

Ex-enterprise-sales founder scaling a sales-led GTM. He had seen marketing become a PR function at his previous company and wanted none of that. But sales-led doesn't mean sales-only — pipeline needed a second source before the AE bench scaled past four. First Head of Marketing was coming onboard. The founder wanted a system in place that made the role revenue-accountable from day one.

What I changed

• →Defined 150 named accounts with legal, risk and compliance leaders as primary champions, researched by the outreach routing agent.
• →SDR and marketing paired into joint sprints instead of hand-off stages.
• →Content plan tied directly to sales cycle stages – discovery, evaluation, legal review, procurement – executed with the angle & content agent.
• →Installed a sales cycle baseline on day one, which the pipeline reporting agent measured against every week.

What happened

• ✓First ABM-sourced pipeline in week 10, ahead of the 12-week plan.
• ✓SQL-to-Opportunity rate settled at 38% from launch — higher than the SDR-only baseline.
• ✓Sales-marketing relationship arrived pre-trusted. No re-org, no political rebuild.
• ✓Head of Marketing walked into a running operating rhythm with a dashboard, not a to-do list.

Situation

VP Marketing had left three weeks earlier. The team was demoralised, reporting was broken, and two consultants had already been through to "run a workshop". Pipeline gap for the upcoming quarter: €2.1M. New Head of Marketing started in week three. What she needed wasn't a strategy offsite. She needed an operating system she could walk into, lead from, and hire against.

What I changed

• →90-day rebuild blueprint, delivered in week one, priced in days not retainers.
• →Two priority levers only: competitive displacement and customer expansion. Everything else paused. The signal agent supplied the right accounts for both levers.
• →Accountability design with RACI at program level, not department level – tracked by the inbox & ops agent.
• →Sprint cadence with hypothesis-result-decision, and a one-page pipeline view for leadership, delivered by the pipeline reporting agent from week one.

What happened

• ✓The €2.1M pipeline gap was closed inside the target quarter.
• ✓Retention stayed stable through a window the board had flagged as high-risk.
• ✓New Head of Marketing hired two roles against a live operating rhythm, not a whiteboard.
• ✓Team sentiment recovered measurably by the end of the first sprint cycle.